The purpose of Multi-Layer Encryption (MLE) is to have only one cipher text, but users with different keys (e.g., in different groups) will obtain different levels of data after they decrypt with their own key. This property is especially useful in surveillance applications, which requires an efficient mechanism for multi-level data access. In this paper, we first address specific requirements for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), and then propose a MLE scheme which has good properties of forward/backward secrecy, without the necessity of time synchronization. In this scheme, users only need to store a constant number of keys regardless of defined secret layers, and higher-level users are able to decrypt more data than lower-level users.
Introduction
Some applications with multiple priority groups need different layers of sensed data (e.g., in a metropolitan surveillance application, the police can see all data, but citizen can only see a subset of the data), this requirement is the main reason to develop MLE. In our architecture, we expect a data server to store encrypted data from sensor nodes, and this data server will authenticate users whenever they request reading specific data. In the following section, we shortly describe our target environment, and supply a summary of notation used throughout this paper. We will precisely describe our multi-layer encryption schemes in Section 3 and discuss some possible attacks in Section 4, then make a conclusion in Section 5.
Background
In this section, we briefly describe the fundamental network architecture applied in our scheme, and the notations we used throughout this paper.
• Sensor Network Environments
In general, sensor nodes face some limitations, including constrained computational power, limited battery life, limited storage space, and deployments in networks [5] .
Because of these sensor node limitations, one popular solution is to have a data server as a supplementary controller (also known as base station [4] ). In this architecture, the data server stores sensed data from sensor nodes, broadcasts beacon signals periodically to maintain the routing topology, and schedules the duty cycle for each node. This periodically broadcasted beacon signals are utilized to develop our MLE scheme.
• Notation For clarity, we list the symbols and notations used throughout this paper below: The identity of sensor node i UID i The identity of user i UK i User key for user i
Base key for layer n of node ID i KE ID i ,Ln,T j Encryption key for layer n of node ID i , during time period T j T i
The 
Multi-Layer Encryption Scheme
Informally, forward secrecy ensures that the past messages are protected even if the current secret key is exposed [3] , and backward secrecy means that the exposed secret key is no longer useful in the future.
As shown in Fig. 1 , this scheme requires the data server to hold one master key MK. The data server randomly generates K G 1 and computes K G 2 , K G 3 by performing one-way hash function, and then gives these keys to G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 users respectively.
The data server periodically broadcasts seedT i to sensor nodes, the value of seedT i could be a computational result of time period T i . For example, as Fig. 1 shows, the date "2007-10-15" could be the 18th time period of our system, so the value of seedT i that the server broadcasts in this time period is seedT 18 , where seedT 18 = AES(MK, "2007-10-15").
Basically, seedT i are used to update encryption keys, since these seedT i values are broadcasted in plaintext, an attacker could record all the values and endanger the system. To avoid this problem, the server gives each sensor node an unique time master key (T MK ID i ) through function T MK ID i = Enc(MK, ID i ). T MK ID i are used to generate time keys (T K ID i ,T j ), and time keys are aimed to update encryption keys for each secret layer through hash function
The reason to perform one-way hash on time keys in each secret layer here is to prevent colluding attack.
The server gives each sensor node a different key set, here we denote it as base key (KB ID i ,L n ), where the subscript ID i denotes that this key belongs to node ID i and L n denotes the secret level of the key. Combining base keys and T K ID i ,T j values can generate encryption keys (KE ID i ,L n ,T j ). This is known as key-insulated methods which are mainly used to provide forward/backward secrecy. In this scheme we also give each user an user key (UK i ) by the generating function UK i = Enc(MK,UID i ). These user keys can be used to perform user authentication and encrypt time key (T K ID i ,T i ) before sending to users.
We use the example that user 1 requests data "2007-10-15" from node ID 3 , the flow is as follows: 9. User 3 in group G 2 only has K G 2 and can deduce K G 3 . If user 3 requests time key from the server, after authenticated herself using UK 3 , the server will know she is in group G 2 , and gives her the value of H(T K 3,18 ) instead of T K 3, 18 . This can prevent the colluding attack because even though user 3 can get K G 1 from a left G 1 user, she still cannot obtain T K 3,18 value, so user 3 can at most obtain M 2 and M 3
Discussion
There are many known attacks in sensor networks, including Denial-of-Service, blackhole, wormhole, Sybil, traffic analysis, node replication, and so on [1, 2] . As a complementary solution, we concentrate on the security of our MLE scheme. There are some possible attacks to our proposed scheme and we evaluate the security here.
• Eavesdropping In our proposed scheme, the only plaintext data adversaries can get is seedT i value, but without the time master key T MK ID i , the seedT i value is useless because it is only a seed value for generating the time key T K ID i ,T j .
• Colluding Attack If a user in lower privileged level collude with a left user in higher privileged level (e.g., user 3 colludes with user 1), although she can get the group key of higher level, after authenticated, the data server will only give the time key of corresponding privileged level (i.e., H L n−1 (T K ID i ,T j )) to her. Without time keys of higher level, the user cannot derive specific encryption keys to obtain the data.
• Compromised sensor nodes In our scheme, each sensor node is given a set of distinct keys, and these keys are only the computational results. Even if specific sensor node is compromised, the adversary will only know these computational results and cannot take any advantage to compromise the other nodes, so the damage will be limited in the range of compromised nodes.
Conclusion
With the proliferation of sensor networks, the amount of privacy-sensitive data that is collected increases continuously. Based on the inherent properties of numerous applications, we observe a tension and tradeoff between privacy and the usefulness of information: very fine-grained data often contains privacy-sensitive information but is the most useful, whereas coarse-grained data protects privacy but is often less useful.
In this paper, we observe that we can break this tradeoff by simultaneously providing access to varying granularities of information, based on the access right of the data consumer. In fact, our efficient cryptographic construction enables sensor nodes to encrypt different granularities of data under different cryptographic keys. We find that our approach is viable even on highly resource-constrained sensor nodes, enabling us to simultaneously achieve several points in the tradeoff space between fine granularity/resolution of data and privacy.
